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1
 The main narrative of Title IX, the 1972 federal law banning sex 
discrimination in federally funded education programs, including school athletic 
programs, is one of success in an era when civil rights laws are more often the source 
of disillusionment than celebration.1 Title IX may be the most celebrated civil rights 
statute in America; every major anniversary of the law prompts symposia, news 
headlines, and “white papers” lauding the statute’s accomplishments.2 It even has 
its own clothing company.3
 The success story line focuses on the law’s effectiveness in expanding
 athletic opportunities for girls and women.4 An oft-repeated statistic illustrates just 
 
     *    Professor of Law and Distinguished Faculty Scholar, University of Pittsburgh. I am 
grateful to Martha Chamallas and Joanna Grossman for reading and commenting on an earlier 
draft of this Article, and for a Dean’s Summer Scholarship grant in support of this work.
      1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88 (2006). For an extended argument highlighting Title IX’s 
successes in comparison with other sex discrimination laws, see Deborah L. brake, GettinG in 
the Game: titLe iX anD the Women’s sports revoLution (2010).
      2. See, e.g., Nat’l Coal. for Girls and Women in Educ., Title IX at 40: Working to Ensure 
Gender Equity in Education (2012), http://www.ncwge.org/TitleIX40/TitleIX-print.pdf.
     3. titLe nine, http://www.titlenine.com (Dec. 15, 2013) (selling women’s clothing, 
undergarments, shoes, and accessories). 
     4. Although Title IX covers much more than sports—it bans all forms of discrimination 
on the basis of sex throughout federally funded education programs—it has received the most 
attention for its impact on athletics. See LinDa Jean Carpenter & r. vivian aCosta, titLe iX 
65 (2004) (“The application of Title IX to athletics has commanded more intense judicial, 
legislative, and executive branch attention than any other endeavor under its jurisdiction.”); 
id. at 84 (“The most publicized effect of Title IX relates to interscholastic and intercollegiate 
athletic programs.”). For a broad look at the impact of Title IX on areas outside of athletics, see 
Nat’l Coal. for Girls and Women in Educ., supra note 2.
how much Title IX has changed the culture of girlhood in the United States: the 
number of girls playing high school varsity sports has gone from the sub-token 
level of one in twenty-seven in 1971 to nearly one in two today.5 In a parallel and 
equally impressive development, the number of intercollegiate female athletes has 
gone from 16,000 in 1970 to about 200,000 in 2012.6 The health, social, economic, 
and cultural implications of this surge in female sports participation are now well 
documented.7 Female athletes comprise over 40% of all high school and college 
athletes.8 Along with these increases in female sports participation have come 
enormous, albeit incomplete, gains in the level of benefits and support for female 
athletes. With these gains in tangible resources, including athletic scholarships, 
have come enhanced prestige and cultural clout.9 It is now nearly impossible to 
watch coverage of the Olympics without hearing glowing references to Title IX 
from commentators lauding the success of U.S. women athletes, especially in team 
sports.10
 However, submerged in this success story is a dissonant subplot. Women 
coaches have not fared so well in the post-Title IX era. Their story is well known 
among women’s sports advocates and Title IX experts, but garners less attention 
in popular accounts of Title IX’s legacy. As jobs coaching women’s sports became 
more desirable, as a result of increased team funding and a rise in coaching salaries, 
men started applying for—and getting—jobs coaching girls’ and women’s sports. 
Thus, women’s share of coaching opportunities in women’s sports has dwindled at 
the same time that women athletes have achieved unparalleled success.
 One piece of the situation facing women coaches—and the focal point of 
this Article—involves a type of bias that does not so neatly or easily register as 
discrimination, at least not as discrimination law traditionally defines it. Yet, it 
deserves a closer look, precisely because of its uncomfortable fit and because of 
what it teaches about the relationship between law and social inequality. The dirty 
     5. See brake, supra note 1, at 67.
     6. R. Vivian Acosta & Linda Jean Carpenter, Women in Intercollegiate Sport: A 
Longitudinal, National Study, Thirty-Five Year Update 1977–2012, at 1 (2012) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://acostacarpenter.org/AcostaCarpenter2012.pdf. 
     7. See brake, supra note 1, at 5–6, for a summary of these benefits.
     8. NCAA, Student-Athlete Participation, nCaa sports sponsorship anD partiCipation 
rates report 1981–82—2011–12, at 5 (Oct. 2012), http://www.ncaapublications.com/
productdownloads/PR2013.pdf (male share of NCAA participation at 56.8%); Nat’l Fed’n of 
State High Sch. Ass’ns, 2011–12 High School Athletics Participation Survey 2 (2012), http://
www.nfhs.org/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=7496&libID=7517 (based 
on number of female, male, and total participants for 2011–12, 41.69% of participants were 
female). 
     9. See Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., The Next Generation of Title IX: Athletics (June 2012), 
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/nwlcathletics_titleixfactsheet.pdf.
     10. See brake, supra note 1, at 1–2.
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little secret of women’s sports is that many female athletes, who are the products of 
a wildly successful feminist law, actually prefer to be coached by men.
 Studies of women in coaching find a modest, but robust preference among 
female athletes for having a male coach.11 Not all female athletes feel this way, and 
the experience of actually having a woman as a coach can change this preference. 
Although as a generalization, the preference stubbornly asserts itself in surveys of 
female athletes. This is one of several, and likely not the most significant, barriers to 
women entering and staying in the coaching profession. However, it is a significant 
problem in its own right, posing an obstacle to women getting hired and proving 
themselves as coaches if they do. It also presents some difficulties and possibilities 
for thinking about how to work within discrimination law to address bias against 
women in leadership positions and in masculine institutions such as athletics.
 This Article examines female athletes’ preferences for male coaches as 
a case study for thinking about the relationship between discrimination law and 
gender bias. The case of female athlete-to-coach bias is counter-paradigmatic to 
discrimination law on multiple levels. As a manifestation of within-group bias, 
it runs counter to the usual pattern of an in-group directing bias against an out- 
group, which is the typical situation that the law recognizes as discrimination. 
Furthermore, as this bias runs from subordinates upward to superiors, it defies the 
law’s presumption of discrimination as a top-down phenomenon. It also sheds light 
on the complicated relationship between discrimination law and women’s agency, 
and exposes the law’s oversimplification of intersectional and multi-directional bias. 
This Article explores this example of within-group, bottom-up bias for what it says 
about the limits of discrimination law and how bias operates within institutions. 
It argues that bringing to the forefront discrimination law’s troubling cases can 
teach important lessons about the promise and limits of using law to address social 
inequality.
 While sport and coaching are distinctive in certain respects, the phenomenon 
of same-gender bias against female superiors is, unfortunately, an all too common 
problem facing women in leadership. Understanding and addressing within-group, 
contra-power bias is important not just for securing equal opportunities for women 
coaches, but for opening pathways for women in leadership more generally.
 Part I examines the barriers confronting women in coaching, honing in on 
the relationship between women coaches and female athletes. It looks to social 
science literature on sport and gender, and social psychology research on women in 
leadership more generally, to better understand this form of bias and the influences 
that shape it.
 Part II explores the numerous ways in which this example is contrary to 
the paradigm of discrimination as recognized in anti-discrimination law. The key 
features discussed are the form that the bias takes, its uncomfortable fit with a 
     11. See infra text accompanying notes 63–67.
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liberal understanding of women’s agency, and its intersectional and interdimensional 
nature. Together, these features explain why woman-to-woman, athlete-to-coach 
bias presents a challenge to the dominant paradigm of discrimination law.
 Part III offers some thoughts about what this example can teach us about 
social inequality and its relationship to anti-discrimination law. The Article 
concludes by urging greater attention to counter paradigms, both for critiquing the 
limits of existing law and for setting a broader agenda beyond legal remedies, for 
gender justice projects.
i. Women CoaChes: troubLe for titLe iX’s suCCess story
 By now it is a familiar lament among women’s sports aficionados that 
women’s share of coaching opportunities has dwindled to a near all-time low in 
the post-Title IX era. But the full dimensions of this aspect of Title IX’s legacy are 
rarely examined. This Part tells that story, starting with the numerical decline of 
women in coaching, then surveying the general barriers blocking women’s access 
to coaching jobs, and finally examining female athletes’ relationship to women 
coaches as an important, though often neglected, part of this story.
A. By the Numbers
 Prior to Title IX, well over 90% of coaches in women’s intercollegiate 
athletics were women.12 However, the percentage of intercollegiate coaches who are 
women has declined to 42.9% today, and has hovered in the low fortieth percentiles 
throughout the past decade.13 This trend does not appear to be tapering off anytime 
soon. Since 1999, men have been hired in nearly 75% of the job openings in 
coaching women’s intercollegiate sports.14
 High school numbers are harder to come by since there is no equivalent to 
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) when it comes to national 
data collection, but the situation for women coaches at the high school level appears 
to be no better—it may even be worse. In Nebraska, for example, where girls’ high 
school basketball is particularly popular, girls’ varsity teams had a woman head 
coach less than 20% of the time.15 Additionally, in Minnesota from 2007 to 2008, 
     12. Acosta & Carpenter, supra note 6, at 17; see also Susan Welch & Lee Sigelman, Who’s 
Calling the Shots? Women Coaches in Division I Women’s Sports, 88 soC. sCi. Q. 1415, 1418 
n.3 (2007) (explaining the methodology behind the 90% figure and reporting that their “spot 
check” of that figure found an even higher ratio of nineteen women out of twenty coaches of 
women’s sports in 1972).
     13. See Acosta & Carpenter supra note 6, at A, 17–18.
     14. Welch & Sigelman, supra note 12, at 1419.
     15. brake, supra note 1, at 202.
4
   Fall 2013                                 Discrimination Inward and Upward
women made up 17.3% of the head coaches in interscholastic sports (boys and girls 
combined), and only 15.1% of the coaches in private youth soccer club teams.16
 Women have not made up for these lost opportunities in the men’s game—the 
share of women coaching men has held steady in the post-Title IX years, hovering 
between 2-3.5%.17 Even this low figure is somewhat misleading, since almost all of 
these jobs are in individual sports where men and women practice under the same 
coach, such as tennis, track, and swimming.18 This shuts women out of the highest 
paying coaching jobs, since coaching salaries in men’s athletics average about 
twice what coaches make in women’s sports.19 The virtual exclusion of women 
coaches from men’s sports likely has a negative effect on women’s access to jobs 
coaching women too, as men have more opportunities to gain coaching experience 
in both men’s and women’s sports, and therefore more opportunities to progress up 
the ranks from an assistant to a head coach.
 For both male and female intercollegiate head coaching jobs, women hold 
just one in every five positions.20 This steep decline and its persistence are all the 
more remarkable in light of the ten-fold expansion occurring after Title IX in the 
numbers of women playing sports, since female athletes should form a greatly 
expanded pool of candidates for coaching jobs.21 The decline in women’s share 
of coaching jobs also stands out because it runs counter to the trend of women’s 
increasing, albeit slowly, share of leadership positions in other professions over 
the same time period.22 Meanwhile, women are working as assistant coaches at 
substantially higher levels than as head coaches, and their share of assistant coaching 
positions has not followed the same trajectory of decline.23 Furthermore, while 
male athletes express higher levels of intention to become intercollegiate athletics 
coaches, female athletes express greater interest than men in coaching at the youth 
and recreational level.24 Together, these findings suggest that the explanation for 
the declining percentage of women coaches is not as simple as a lack of interest in 
     16. Nicole M. LaVoi, Occupational Sex Segregation in a Youth Soccer Organization: 
Females in Positions of Power, 18 Women in sport & physiCaL aCtivity J. 25, 27, 30 (2009).
     17. Acosta & Carpenter, supra note 6, at 17.
     18. Id.
     19. Deborah L. Rhode & Christopher J. Walker, Gender Equity in College Athletics: 
Women Coaches as a Case Study, 4 stan. J. C.r. & C.L. 1, 15 (2008).
     20. See Kelli Moran-Miller & Lisa Y. Flores, Where are the Women in Women’s Sports? 
Predictors of Female Athletes’ Interest in a Coaching Career, 82 res. Q. for eXerCise & sport 
109, 109 (2011).
     21. Robert Drago, Lynn Hennighausen, Jacqueline Rogers, Teresa Vescio & Kai Dawn 
Stauffer, Final Report for CAGE: The Coaching and Gender Equity Project 3 (Aug. 19, 2005), 
www.epi.soe.vt.edu/perspectives/policy_news/docs/CAGE.doc.
     22. See Welch & Sigelman, supra note 12, at 1415.
     23. See Rhode & Walker, supra note 19, at 12.
     24. Cindra Kamphoff & Diane Gill, Collegiate Athletes’ Perceptions of the Coaching 
Profession, 3 int’L J. sports sCi. & CoaChinG 55, 63 (2008).
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coaching per se.
 As bad as the picture is when looking at coaching opportunities by gender 
alone, it is even worse for women of color. Although it is hard to get a clear 
picture, as the numbers are not always broken down by race and gender, women 
of color have a disproportionately low share of coaching jobs. In women’s college 
basketball, for example, where African American women comprise 51.5% of the 
athletes in the game, African American women make up only 11.4% of the coaches.25 
African American men and women together hold just 7.2% of the head coaching 
jobs for NCAA Division I women’s teams, and that number plummets to 4.8% 
and 3.9% respectively in Divisions II and III.26 Latinos and Asians fare even worse 
with just 2.9% and 1.3% respectively of the head coaching jobs in all of women’s 
intercollegiate athletics.27 White women make up over 90% of the women working 
full time as intercollegiate coaches.28 This figure is even more disproportionate for 
women coaches than it is for men coaches in intercollegiate coaching jobs.29
 While the numbers themselves tell an important part of the story, a growing 
body of interdisciplinary research on sport and gender paints a more vivid picture. 
The next Part turns to that literature.
B. Surveying the Barriers Confronting Women in Coaching
 Before examining the bias from female athletes against female coaches, it 
is important to understand the institutional context facing women in coaching. It is 
not simply a matter of an intentional decision to avoid hiring women. Sport is an 
institution that is deeply gendered, and numerous institutional biases compound the 
difficulties facing women entering the coaching profession.
 Research on women in coaching identifies many barriers to equal 
opportunity, including closed hiring networks, the absence of well-developed 
standards and qualifications for coaching, a lack of mentoring, anti-lesbian bias 
and homophobia, and work demands that are incompatible with a balanced life. In 
addition to the specific ways that the hiring process and the nature of the job favor 
men, the culture of sport and of coaching are deeply masculinized. Both sport and 
     
     25. Nicole M. LaVoi & Julia K. Dutove, Barriers and Supports for Female Coaches: An 
Ecological Model, 1 sports CoaChinG rev. 17, 18 (2012) (citing Richard Lapchick, Brian 
Hoff & Christopher Kaiser, The 2010 Racial and Gender Report Card: College Sport, inst. 
for Diversity & ethiCs in sport 5–6 (2011), www.tidesport.org/rgrc/2010/2010_college_rgrc_
final.pdf).
     26. Id. at 17–18.
     27. Id. at 18.
     28. Drago et al., supra note 21, at 5.
     29. Id. at 43 (“Whites are more prevalent among women as compared to men in coaching 
. . . .”); id. at 50 (noting, for comparison, that white men make up 84% of the men holding full-
time coaching jobs in intercollegiate sports).
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leadership are culturally coded as male, which makes coaching a particularly tough 
field for women to infiltrate.30
 One important factor affecting women’s opportunities in coaching is the 
gender structure of sport leadership. The leadership in athletics is overwhelmingly 
male. Men dominate the ranks of athletic director—especially at the most competitive 
Division I level where only 8% of the athletic directors are women.31 Male athletic 
directors are more likely to hire male coaches, not necessarily out of any conscious 
intention, but likely due to the informal networks that play a significant role in 
hiring decisions.32 In Division III, male athletic directors hire 4.2% fewer women 
than men as coaches, while in Division I male athletic directors hire 9% fewer 
women than men as coaches.33 Conversely, women athletic directors are more likely 
than male athletic directors to hire women coaches, but very few women make it to 
the director level.34 Women are also more likely to be hired if there is at least one 
highly placed woman in the athletics administration.35 These figures show that the 
more male dominated the athletics leadership is, the less likely it is that women will 
be hired as coaches.
 Women’s opportunities in coaching also vary by the level of competition 
and the gender typing of particular sports. In general, women’s representation 
in coaching declines as the ages of athletes rise and/or the level of competition 
increases.36 Women’s coaching opportunities increase farther down the athletics 
food chain, and especially in non-elite sports. The proportion of women coaches 
is highest for athletes in the younger years, in non-scholastic, youth sports, 
and—at all levels—in sports that are characterized as traditionally feminine.37 
For example, women have a particularly high representation as coaches in sports 
such as synchronized swimming, gymnastics, figure skating, field hockey, and 
volleyball—all sports that are traditionally gender typed as “appropriate” for girls.38 
When women do coach, they are significantly more likely than male coaches to 
coach part time instead of full time.39 The fact women do better in “softer” coaching 
     30. See Leanne Norman, Bearing the Burden of Doubt: Female Coaches’ Experiences of 
Gender Relations, 81 res. Q. for eXerCise & sport 506 (2010).
     31. Welch & Sigelman, supra note 12, at 1424.
     32. Norman, supra note 30, at 508.
     33. Drago et al., supra note 21, at 13.
     34. See Welch & Sigelman, supra note 12, at 1421 (citing research attributing the low 
numbers of women high school coaches to the absence of women athletic directors).
     35. LaVoi & Dutove, supra note 25, at 26.
     36. LaVoi, supra note 16, at 31–33.
     37. Id. at 27, 31–33.
     38. See id. at 27; LaVoi & Dutove, supra note 25, at 28; see also Rhode & Walker, supra 
note 19, at 13 (giving representation of women head coaches in field hockey by percentage).
     39. Drago et al., supra note 21, at 40 (noting that around one-third of the men in NCAA 
coaching and scouting jobs are employed part-time or part-year, but that more than half of the 
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jobs training younger, less accomplished athletes in traditionally feminine sports, 
reveals important connections between the gender typing of jobs and women’s 
opportunities in coaching.
 The masculine gender typing of both athletics and coaching likely influences 
how men and women see themselves in these jobs. Sport literature has documented 
a gender difference in coaches’ self-perceptions and their willingness to apply for 
coaching jobs. Elite-level female coaches with extensive experience are reluctant 
to apply for coaching jobs unless they possess all of the posted requirements for 
accreditation and experience, whereas male coaches are much more likely to apply 
even without possessing such posted requirements as they believe they can make 
up for a lack of objective credentials with extra ability and charisma.40 Relatedly, 
female assistant coaches with the same level of experience are less likely to express 
an intention to become a head coach compared to male assistant coaches.41 This 
intention gap begins even earlier—among college athletes, women are less likely 
to express an intention to enter intercollegiate coaching.42
 While this gender gap in intention and application might be pegged as 
an example of women not “leaning in,”43 women internalizing the problem in 
themselves deflects attention from the built-in headwinds women face that are 
outside their control. The terrain of coaching is not an equal playing field. Between 
coaches with similar experience and credentials, female coaches are more likely to 
feel undervalued and underpaid.44
 Moreover, other evidence suggests that women’s own reluctance to enter 
the coaching profession is not the main reason for their underrepresentation. For 
example, female athletes are more likely to express plans to go into recreational 
and youth coaching than male athletes, which suggests that the gap is not for lack 
of interest or aptitude in coaching itself.45 While “choice” is sometimes heralded 
as the reason for the gender gap in coaching—usually in combination with work, 
family, and life balance considerations—the research on this point does not support 
this explanation. One important study found, contrary to suggestions that women’s 
choices regarding work and family balance explain their underrepresentation in 
coaching, that there were no gender differences in how time and family obligations 
women in coaching are in half-time or part-year positions).
     40. LaVoi & Dutove, supra note 25, at 23 (citing Jeff Greenhill, Chris Auld, Graham 
Cuskelly & Sue Hooper, The Impact of Organisational Factors on Career Pathways for Female 
Coaches, 12 sport mGmt. rev. 229 (2009)).
     41. Id. at 24 (citing Michael Sagas & George B. Cunningham, Work and Family Conflict 
Among College Assistant Coaches, 6 int’L J. sport mGmt. 183 (2005)).
     42. See id. at 23–24. 
     43. See sheryL sanDberG, Lean in: Women, Work, anD the WiLL to LeaD 10 (2013) 
(noting that male coaches are more likely to apply even when they do not have the required 
credentials, and using this as an example of women’s failure to assert themselves).
     44. See id.
     45. See Kamphoff & Gill, supra note 24, at 63.
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affected college athletes’ coaching plans.46
 Female coaches at all levels of sport believe that athletic administrators 
perceive female coaches to be less competent than male coaches and that they are 
more reluctant to hire women.47 Sport and gender literature validates this perception.48 
There appears to be a systemic undervaluing of women coaches’ skills. One study 
found that female basketball coaches with greater athletic experience were passed 
over for male coaches with no collegiate playing experience; the women also had 
more coaching experience and greater educational achievement.49 Studies such 
as this support sport sociologist Michael Messner’s conclusion that the informal 
structures of sport exclude women as coaches and render them outsiders in the 
male-dominated, masculine world of sport.50
 Specific aspects of the hiring process, particularly the subjectivity of 
coaching qualifications and the discretionary nature of the hiring decision, open 
the door to gender bias and make personal connections unduly important.51 The 
recruiting process is often informal and highly dependent on personal connections.52 
The “old boys’ clubs” are alive and well in sport and are particularly influential 
in allocating coaching opportunities.53 Unlike many fields, most coaching jobs 
lack objective qualifications or professional certification.54 Sought after skills and 
qualifications, such as leadership ability, are subjective and informal. Notably, the 
one major Division I women’s sport that has done better for women coaches in 
     46. Id. at 70; see also C. Bonnie Everhart & Packianathan Chelladurai, Gender Differences 
in Preferences for Coaching as an Occupation: The Role of Self-Efficacy, Valence, and Perceived 
Barriers, 69 res. Q. for eXerCise & sport 188, 196 (1998) (discussing the findings of a study 
of male and female intercollegiate athletes’ interests in a coaching career, which refuted the 
“choice” explanation for the low levels of women in coaching).
     47. LaVoi & Dutove, supra note 25, at 27.
     48. See, e.g., id. (citations omitted).
     49. See George B. Cunningham & Michael Sagas, The Differential Effects of Human 
Capital for Male and Female Division I Basketball Coaches, 73 res. Q. for eXerCise & sport 
489, 492–93 (2002).
     50. See miChaeL a. messner, it’s aLL for the kiDs: GenDer, famiLies, anD youth sports 
(2009); see also Michael a. Messner & Suzel Bozada-Deas, Separating the Men from the 
Moms: The Making of Adult Gender Segregation in Youth Sports, 23 GenD. & soC. 49 (2009).
     51. See, e.g., Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Constructed Criteria: Redefining 
Merit to Justify Discrimination, 16 psyChoL. sCi. 474, 474 (2005) (discussing research findings 
that ambiguity in hiring criteria primes decision makers for stereotyping, which enables them to 
pick the criteria that selects the preferred candidate and creates a veneer of neutrality that masks 
bias).
     52. Norman, supra note 30, at 508; Leanne Norman, Gendered Homophobia in Sport and 
Coaching: Understanding the Everyday Experiences of Lesbian Coaches, 47 int’L rev. for 
soC. sport 705, 717–18 (2011).
     53. LaVoi & Dutove, supra note 25, at 25 (“[T]he existence and strength of Old Boys’ 
Clubs was [sic] one of the most frequently cited barriers by female coaches.”).
     54. See Drago et al., supra note 21, at 13–14.
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recent years is soccer—the only sport that sets formal licensing requirements for 
its coaches.55 The vagaries of the hiring process, loosely defined job qualifications, 
and informality of hiring networks tend to work in favor of men seeking coaching 
jobs.56
 When women do get hired, they have higher rates of attrition from the 
coaching profession. The women who leave often cite the gender hierarchy of 
intercollegiate athletics and the lower levels of support for women’s programs.57 Here 
too, women of color face compounded hurdles that challenge their staying power 
in the profession.58 Black female assistant coaches, for example, are more often 
saddled with lower status and tedious responsibilities, such as being the designated 
recruiter instead of being given more strategic, higher-status responsibilities that 
lead to upward mobility.59
 The work culture for women also takes a toll. Women coaches have to 
navigate “a complex double bind” in presenting themselves to the team and the 
outside world.60 The qualities of effective coaching, and sport itself, are tightly 
associated with masculinity, and yet culturally, women are still penalized for 
transgressing gender stereotypes. As two sport scholars put it, women coaches “are 
left to negotiate conformance to feminine norms while simultaneously demonstrating 
competence by exhibiting male/masculine behaviors that society upholds as 
coaching effectiveness.”61 Not surprisingly then, the “female apologetic” in which 
athletic women engage in feminized performances to minimize their vulnerability 
to being masculinized through sport plays out among women coaches too.62 One of 
the more visible manifestations of this is the image of the female basketball coach 
    
     55. Id. at 14, 64 n.24 (noting that of the nine major women’s sports in Division I, only 
soccer, which licenses its coaches through the U.S. Soccer Federation, had an increase in 
women’s share of coaching jobs from 1977–2004).
     56. See id. at 4–5, 12–14.
     57. Cindra S. Kamphoff, Bargaining with Patriarchy, 81 res. Q. for eXerCise & sport 
360, 365–66 (2010).
     58.  See generally presumeD inCompetent: the interseCtions of raCe anD CLass for 
Women in aCaDemia (Gabriella Gutierrez y muhs, yolanda flores niemann, Carmen G. 
Gonzalez & angela p. harris eds., 2012) (discussing the barriers facing women of color in 
securing, retaining, and succeeding in leadership positions in higher education).
     59.  See John F. Borland & Jennifer E. Bruening, Navigating Barriers: A Qualitative 
Examination of the Under-Representation of Black Females as Head Coaches in Collegiate 
Basketball, 13 sport mGmt. rev. 407, 409 (2010).
     60.  LaVoi & Dutove, supra note 25, at 28.
     61.  Id.
     62.  See Mary Jo Kane, Media Coverage of the Post Title IX Female Athlete: A Feminist 
Analysis of Sport, Gender, and Power, 3 Duke J. GenDer L. & poL’y 95, 121 (1996) (discussing 
the “female apologetic” as a tactic whereby athletic women “overcompensate for their so-called 
masculine behavior such as sweating and being physically strong and powerful”); Norman, 
supra note 30, at 513 (discussing female coaches’ performance of a female apologetic).
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running up and down the court in high heels.
 Depressing as all of this may be, none of it treads new ground; the barriers 
to women coaches are well traveled in sport and gender literature. However, there 
is one piece of the situation facing women coaches that has not received much 
attention—one that I have always found to be especially troubling. Buried within 
the gendered structures of sport that set high hurdles for women coaches is a subtle, 
but stubborn resistance to women coaches from women athletes themselves. The 
next Part takes up this issue.
 C. A Missing Piece of the Puzzle: Female Athletes’ Preferences for Male  
 Coaches
 
 The above discussion reveals numerous reasons for the drop off in women 
coaches. In this complex stew of institutional bias, one additional problem confronting 
women coaches has received less attention. Among the reasons cited by women for 
not going into coaching or for leaving the profession are: difficult and negative 
interactions with athletes, including a lack of equal respect for female coaches; and 
widely known preference for male coaches, especially at the elite varsity levels of 
sport.63 A variety of sources confirm the existence of such a preference, although 
the evidence is somewhat mixed regarding the commonality of the preference. In 
a recent NCAA survey, 52% of the female student athletes surveyed expressed a 
preference for having a man as their coach.64 Similarly, a report for the Coaching 
and Gender Equity Project (CAGE) —which is funded by the NCAA, the National 
Association of Collegiate Women Athletics Administrators, and the Commission for 
Women and Athletics of Pennsylvania State University—found in its focus groups 
of athletes “a high level of discriminatory or stereotypical attitudes among female 
athletes, most of whom favored male over female coaches.”65 Also, in studies of 
athletes, both male and female athletes express a belief that male coaches are more 
competent and superior to female coaches.66 This perception survives despite the 
absence of any evidence whatsoever that women coaches are actually less qualified 
     63.  LaVoi & Dutove, supra note 25, at 25 (“Negative interactions with athletes was also 
given as a barrier, which included a lack of respect for female coaches and an open preference 
for male coaches.”). 
     64.  nCaa, Perceived Barriers: Gender Equity in College Coaching and Administration, 
2008 perCeiveD barriers report 7 (Jan. 2009), www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/
BAR09.pdf. The next largest share expressed no preference, followed by a smaller number 
expressing a preference for a woman coach. See id. at 7–8. Only 23% expressed a preference 
by race. Id. at 8.
     65.  Drago et al., supra note 21, at 4.
     66.  Andrew Manley, Iain Greenlees, Richard Thelwell & Matthew Smith, Athletes’ Use of 
Reputation and Gender Information when Forming Initial Expectancies of Coaches, 5 int’L J. 
sports sCi. & CoaChinG 517, 527 (2010).
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or competent than male coaches; in fact, most evidence suggests quite the opposite.67
 Female athletes’ preference for a male coach is disconcerting, and yet, on 
reflection, unsurprising given the gender dynamics of sport. As discussed above, 
sport is a deeply “gendered institution.”68 Leadership is also strongly gender 
typed as masculine. Leadership in sport is integrally bound up with a traditional, 
patriarchal masculinity. Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony famously explains 
how gender relations are perpetuated not so much by the raw exercise of power as 
by the “consent of the led,” procured through ideology.69 As sport scholar Leanne 
Norman explains, “The ideology of men being ‘better’ coaches is manipulated into 
common sense consciousness, and so even women perceive reality through this 
thinking.”70 Common narratives portraying men as naturally superior athletes and 
the rightful leaders of sport contribute to internalized understandings of men as 
superior coaches, even among female athletes.71 The low percentage of women in 
coaching is not just a product of this ideology, but a sustaining force—the absence 
of women in sport leadership bolsters the associations between coaching and 
masculinity, showcasing men as the purveyors of excellence in coaching.72
 The gendering of sport as an institution is central to understanding why 
women athletes might openly prefer to have a man as their coach. Coaching itself 
is gender typed as a masculine job. When women take on the role of athletic coach, 
they step into a role conflict in which the masculine qualities of a coach clash with the 
gender expectations for women. Women are then penalized for exhibiting behaviors 
that are identified as masculine. For example, studies find that female athletes object 
more to being yelled at by a female coach than by a male coach.73 Some women 
     
     67. See, e.g., Willie Burden, Trey Burdette, Drew Zwald, Daniel R. Czech & Tom Buckley, 
Evidence That Support Equality: Credential Characteristics of Georgia Female High School 
Coaches, 13 sport J. (2010), http://www.thesportjournal.org/article/evidence-support-equality-
credential-characteristics-georgia-female-high-school-coaches; Cunningham & Sagas, supra 
note 49; Rhode & Walker, supra note 19, at 14, 20–21; cf. Alice H. Eagly, Female Leadership 
Advantage and Disadvantage: Resolving the Contradictions, 31 psCyhoL. Women Q. 1 (2007) 
(discussing research showing that more people prefer male bosses, notwithstanding the fact that 
women more often than men have effective leadership styles).
     68. See Welch & Sigelman, supra note 12, at 1421.
     69. See Norman, supra note 30, at 507, 509 (applying this theory to better understand 
gender relations in athletics coaching).
     70. Id. at 509.
     71. See LaVoi & Dutove, supra note 25, at 28.
     72. See Norman, supra note 30, at 716 (explaining that the “invisibility of women in 
coaching” sustains the ideology of men as superior coaches and negatively affects female 
coaches’ relationship to athletes, as well as citing research finding that “some athletes were 
uncomfortable or reluctant to be coached by a woman”).
     73. See, e.g., Daniel Frankl & Donald G. Babbitt III, Gender Bias: A Study of High School 
Track & Field Athletes’ Perceptions of Hypothetical Male and Female Head Coaches, 21 J. 
sport behav. 396, 406 (1998) (finding in a study of high school track and field athletes that 
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coaches who sense this compensate by delegating to a male assistant coach the task 
of delivering bad news or meting out punishments, as a man performing these tasks 
is more likely to get a better reception than a woman.74 Male coaches, in contrast, 
are presumed to be competent and are instantly “more successful in commanding 
the respect of players by the inherent power of their authority as men.”75
 Female athletes fighting for respect in the masculine world of sport may 
also seek out whatever gains in status might accrue from having a male coach, 
given the associations between masculinity and athletic excellence.76 As one person 
interviewed for the CAGE Report explained, “So it’s the viewpoint of . . . [who] 
do you think [is] more valuable? The women’s head coach or a male coach on a 
lower level. And right now . . . they think that the male is more valuable coming 
into our side.”77 A student athlete quoted in the CAGE Report summed it up even 
more succinctly by saying, “[T]here’s just something more credible about male 
coaches.”78 The ubiquity of male coaches solidifies these connections between 
masculinity and athletic excellence, which supports the perception that men are 
superior coaches. Women, by contrast, have to overcome a presumption of doubt 
when they step into the role of coach, and need to work extra hard to earn athletes’ 
respect and a perception of competence.79
 It is not just gender bias acting alone that supports the preference for men. 
Homophobia against women in sport greatly contributes to the bias against female 
coaches.80 Sport and gender scholars use the term “gendered homophobia” for the 
female athletes reacted more negatively to being yelled at or corrected by a female coach than a 
male coach); see also Drago et al., supra note 21, at 23 (citing comments to that effect).
     74. Robin Wilson, Where Have All the Women Gone? Even as the Number of Female 
Players Soars, College Coaching Is Increasingly a Male Domain, Chron. hiGher eDuC. (D.C.), 
May 4, 2007, at A40.
     75. Drago et al., supra note 21, at 29.
     76.  The converse of the masculine prestige that comes from having a male leader also appears 
to be true—literature on women in leadership suggests that women leaders may gain prestige 
by supervising men instead of women. For example, some research suggests that female and 
minority managers gain a credibility boost from supervising male and white workers. See, e.g., 
C. Elizabeth Hirsh & Sabino Kornrich, The Context of Discrimination: Workplace Conditions, 
Institutional Environments, and Sex and Race Discrimination Charges, 113 am. J. soC. 1394, 
1419, 1423 (2008) (finding that “the positive effect of female and minority management on 
reasonable-cause findings [by the EEOC] is strongest in workplaces where females manage 
male workers and minorities manage white workers,” and suggesting as a possible explanation 
for this that female and minority managers who complain of discrimination are viewed as more 
competent and credible if they manage higher-status employees).
     77. Drago et al., supra note 21, at 22.
     78. Id. at 31.
     79. See Norman, supra note 30, at 510–13.
     80. Cf. LaVoi & Dutove, supra note 25, at 29 (“Unsurprisingly, female coaches often cite 
the homophobic climate of sport as the strongest deterrent for entering or remaining in the 
profession.”).
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distinctively anti-lesbian homophobia that hurts women of any sexual orientation 
who seek leadership positions in sport.81 Sport is often cited as one of the most 
hostile institutions toward lesbians and women suspected of being lesbian.82 
Straight women also feel the effects of anti-lesbian bias in sport.83 The easiest way 
to bulletproof a team against charges of lesbianism or a lesbian image is to hire a 
male coach. Scholar and activist Pat Griffin attributes female athletes’ preferences 
for male coaches to “a lethal mix” of sexism and homophobia.84
 This gendered homophobia in women’s sport drives parents, athletes, and 
administrators to prefer male coaches in order to dispel a stigma of lesbianism 
from women’s sport, especially in more “masculine” team sports.85 Teams with 
an unmarried (to a man) female coach are vulnerable to the widespread practice 
known as “negative recruiting”—whereby the coach of a competing program uses 
code words like “family values” to distinguish their program from others that 
might be coached by a lesbian—a phenomenon that reinforces preferences for male 
coaches.86 Having a male coach can manage the “image problem” of female sports 
by deflecting implicit associations with lesbianism. Women cite the homophobic 
climate in sport as one of the strongest reasons for leaving or not entering the 
coaching profession.87
 While the preference for a male coach now stubbornly persists in surveys of 
athletes, it has been a relatively new development that has taken hold from the time 
when women’s sports became increasingly popular and more strongly integrated 
into university athletic programs. As recently as the mid-1980s, some studies found 
no preference by female athletes for a coach of either gender.88 The preference 
for a male coach became entrenched in sport literature during the 1990s, as men 
solidified their majority in the ranks of coaching jobs.89 Since then, this preference 
     81.  Norman, supra note 30, at 705.
     82.  Id. at 706. Estimates put the percentage of women coaches who are lesbian as high as 
6%. Drago et al., supra note 21, at 5.
     83.  See Kamphoff, supra note 57, at 361 (“all female coaches, particularly if they are 
single, are at risk of being stereotyped as a lesbian”); LaVoi & Dutove, supra note 25, at 29 
(“homophobia affects all females regardless of sexual identity”).
     84.  pat Griffin, stronG Women, Deep CLosets: Lesbians anD homophobia in sport 84 
(1998).
     85.  Norman, supra note 30, at 706–07 (discussing the preference for male coaches as a 
symptom and expression of homophobia in women’s sports).
     86.  See Amy Sandler, Perceptions of “Others”: The Role of Heterosexism in the 
Decline of College Women Coaches (Dec. 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas) (on file with author) (reviewing literature on negative recruiting, reporting 
results of interviews with coaches confirming the existence of the practice, and detailing how it 
contributes to the decline of women in coaching jobs).
     87.  LaVoi & Dutove, supra note 25, at 29; Norman, supra note 30, at 708.
     88.  LaVoi & Dutove, supra note 25, at 25.
     89.  See id. at 25.
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has appeared in numerous studies of athlete preferences.90 It is especially discernible 
among female athletes in team sports—more so than in individual sports.91
 While the preference remains resilient, it is not impervious to athletes’ 
experiences. Female athletes, who have been coached by a woman, do not express 
the same preference for a male coach as compared to female athletes overall.92 
By contrast, having never had a female coach or only having had a female coach 
once in an athletic career, heightens the preference for a male coach.93 The gender 
preference for a coach can also be neutralized by sharing information about the 
positive reputation of a specific female coach.94
 Despite the preference for a male coach, there are significant benefits to 
women athletes who have a woman as a coach, including an increased likelihood 
that female athletes will go into coaching themselves.95 The low levels of women 
in prestigious coaching positions have negative spillover effects on women as 
athletes, which deprives them of strong female role models in sport, devalues 
women’s athletic abilities, and fuels gender stereotypes that limit women’s athletic 
opportunities.96 As sport sociologist Leanne Norman explains, “Associating 
coaching with masculinity is a hugely powerful barrier to accepting women in 
sport, both as leaders and athletes.”97
     90.  See, e.g., Melinda Frey, Daniel R. Czech, Rebecca G. Kent & Matthew Johnson, An 
Exploration of Female Athletes’ Experiences and Perceptions of Male and Female Coaches, 9 
sport J. (2006), http://thesportjournal.org/article/exploration-female-athletes-experiences-and-
perceptions-male-and-female-coaches (finding nine out of twelve participating NCAA female 
athletes expressed a preference for male coaches); Denise M. Haselwood, A. Barry Joyner, 
Kevin L. Burke, Chris B. Geyerman, Daniel R. Czech, Barry A. Munkasy & A. Drew Zwald, 
Female Athletes’ Perceptions of Head Coaches’ Communication Competence, 28 J. sport 
behav. 216 (2005) (discussing a preference for male coaches as “better communicators”); 
Manley et al., supra note 66, at 517.
     91.  See Frankl & Babbitt, supra note 73, at 405.
     92.  See Stephanie Habif, Judy L. Van Raalte & Allen Cornelius, Athletes’ Attitudes Toward 
and Preferences for Male and Female Coaches, 10 Women in sport & physiCaL aCtivity J. 73 
(2001) (“It appears that one of the important factors in reducing gender bias among collegiate 
athletes may be having the opportunity to play for both male and female coaches.”); see also 
June E. LeDrew & Corinne Zimmerman, Moving Towards an Acceptance of Females in 
Coaching, 51 physiCaL eDuCator 6 (1994) (finding that female athletes in the study expressed a 
preference for a male coach, but noting that most did not have experience with a female coach).
     93.  Drago et al., supra note 21, at 31.
     94.  See Manley et al., supra note 66, at 517.
     95.  LaVoi, supra note 16, at 28; LaVoi & Dutove, supra note 25, at 24 (“Although 
many female athletes professed to prefer male coaches, having a female coach increased the 
likelihood that such athletes would consider coaching as a subsequent viable career option.”); 
Moran-Miller & Flores, supra note 20, at 110; see also Everhart & Chelladurai, supra note 46, 
at 193–95 (illustrating that female athletes coached by a woman were more likely to express an 
interest in coaching themselves).
     96.  LaVoi, supra note 16, at 27–28; Rhode & Walker, supra note 19, at 14.
     97.  Norman, supra note 30, at 512.
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 While the impact of the preference for male coaches on women’s coaching 
opportunities cannot be quantified, it certainly does not help women gain a stronger 
foothold in the coaching profession. Some people, including a former athletic 
director, admit that lack of support from female athletes is among the reasons for 
not hiring a woman coach.98 Biased expectations about women as coaches can also 
affect the coach’s ability to do the job once hired, and athletes’ expectations about 
their coaches can affect the coach-athlete relationship in ways central to the coach’s 
success.99 Literature on women in leadership supports this relationship between 
gender bias and success as perceptions of women as inferior managers and bosses 
result in a lower level of effectiveness in managing subordinates.100 This kind of 
effect on performance is particularly a concern for women coaches—perhaps more 
so than for women in other leadership positions—since coaches need to recruit 
the best athletes they can in recruiting for their program, which is directly tied to 
their success as coaches.101 As one person interviewed for the CAGE Report put it, 
“[R]ecruiting [by a female coach is an issue]. Your recruits see a male winning the 
national title. That has a lot to do with their mindset: ‘Oh, I’m going to go play for 
a male because they can get it done.’”102
 The bias against women coaches is a specific iteration of a more general 
bias against women in leadership positions. Literature from the fields of social 
psychology and sociology demonstrates gender bias in the resistance to women 
leaders emanating from their subordinates.103 Social psychology research posits a 
theory of role incongruity to explain this bias, where the qualities associated with 
leadership clash with the qualities associated with femininity.104 Consistent with this 
     98.  Wilson, supra note 74; see also Welch & Sigelman, supra note 12, at 1422 (“some 
have suggested that women athletes themselves prefer to be coached by men and that this 
preference in turn influences athletic administrators”).
     99.   Manley et al., supra note 66, at 517–18.
     100.   See Alice H. Eagly, Achieving Relational Authenticity in Leadership: Does Gender 
Matter?, 16 LeaDership Q. 459 (2005); Margaret Madden, Four Gender Stereotypes of Leaders: 
Do They Influence Leadership in Higher Education?, 9 WaGaDu 55, 57 (2011); Jeanine L. 
Prime, Nancy M. Carter & Theresa M. Welbourne, Women “Take Care,” Men “Take Charge”: 
Managers’ Stereotypic Perceptions of Women and Men Leaders, 12 psyChoLoGist-manaGer J. 
25 (2009); Kristyn A. Scott & Douglas J. Brown, Female First, Leader Second? Gender Bias in 
the Encoding of Leadership Behavior, 101 orGanizationaL behav. & hum. DeCision proCesses 
230, 238–39 (2006).
     101.   Drago et al., supra note 21, at 4, 22–24 (discussing recruiting disadvantages faced by 
women coaches due to athletes’ preference for a male coach).
     102.   Id. at 22–23 (alteration in original).
     103.  See Diane M. Martin, Humor in Middle Management: Women Negotiating the 
Paradoxes of Organizational Life, 32 J. appLieD Comm. res. 147, 148 (2004) (discussing bias 
favoring men in management).
     104.  See, e.g., Alice H. Eagly & Steven J. Karau, Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice 
Toward Female Leaders, 109 psyChoL. rev. 573, 573–76 (2002); Stefanie K. Johnson, Susan 
Elaine Murphy, Selamawit Zewdie & Rebecca J. Reichard, The Strong, Sensitive Type: Effects 
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theory, polling data shows a plurality of workers express a preference for a male 
boss over a female boss.105
 There is an added dimension of woman-to-woman bias here as well. Women 
are some of the toughest critics of the women seeking leadership roles. Although 
at one time surveys found higher preferences among men for male bosses, more 
recent polls find the preference for male bosses to be greater among women than 
men.106 A number of studies support this data, finding that women have as much 
or even greater bias than men do against female leaders.107 Women may react even 
more negatively than men to role incongruity by a female boss. One study found 
that women expressed greater disapproval than men of self-promoting behaviors 
by women leaders.108 As an indication of the difficulty women face in rising to 
leadership positions in women-dominated environments, social scientists studying 
gender in leadership coined the metaphor of a “glass escalator” to describe the 
phenomenon of men rising to leadership positions in female-dominated industries 
of Gender Stereotypes and Leadership Prototypes on the Evaluation of Male and Female 
Leaders, 106 orGanizationaL behav. & hum. DeCision proCesses 39, 55–56 (2008). The role 
incongruity may even cause the hiring criteria to shift when women do meet masculine-typed 
hiring criteria, which reflects a backlash against women for departing from feminine roles. 
See Julie E. Phelan, Corinne A. Moss-Racusin & Laurie A. Rudman, Competent Yet Out in 
the Cold: Shifting Criteria for Hiring Reflect Backlash Toward Agentic Women, 32 psyChoL. 
Women Q. 406 (2008).
     105.  David J. Maume, Meet the New Boss . . . Same as the Old Boss? Female Supervisors 
and Subordinate Career Prospects, 40 soC. sCi. res. 287, 289 (2011); see Madden, supra note 
99, at 58–59.
     106.  Eagly & Karau, supra note 104, at 579.
     107.  See Kim M. Elsesser & Janet Lever, Does Gender Bias Against Female Leaders 
Persist? Quantitative and Qualitative Data from a Large-Scale Survey, 64 hum. reL. 1555, 
1567–68, 1571–72 (2011) (reporting findings from a study showing a larger percentage of 
women than men preferred to work for male managers); Rocio Garcia-Retamero & Esther 
López-Zafra, Prejudice Against Women in Male-Congenial Environments: Perceptions of 
Gender Role Congruity in Leadership, 55 seX roLes 51, 59 (2006) (reporting findings from a 
study showing that female subjects showed more prejudice against female leaders than men). 
The preference may not be wholly irrational; some research finds that under some conditions, 
men actually benefit more than women from having a female boss. See Maume, supra note 
105, at 293 (reporting findings that “men who report to female supervisors get significantly 
more career support, in contrast to the insignificant female supervisor effect among women[,] . 
. . suggesting that female supervisors pay more attention to male than female subordinates as a 
way of conforming to organizational expectations in order to advance men’s career prospects”). 
     108.  Eagly & Karau, supra note 104, at 584; see also Madeline E. Heilman, Aaron  S. 
Wallen, Daniella Fuchs & Melinda M. Tamkins, Penalties for Success: Reactions to Women 
Who Succeed at Male Gender-Typed Tasks, 89 J. appLieD psyChoL. 416, 426 (2004) (discussing 
findings of studies showing that female subjects reacted just as negatively as men to female 
leaders); Prime et al., supra note 100, at 44 (discussing research findings that both men and 
women viewed sex as a predictor of leadership effectiveness, but that women did so more than 
men).
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and organizations.109
 On the other hand, the preference for men in leadership is not impervious 
to actual experience; positive experiences with actual female bosses may help 
counteract prejudices favoring a male boss.110 However, even when women overcome 
bias in hiring and manage to succeed as leaders, they often pay a social penalty that 
may have consequences for their continued success and upward mobility—when 
women hold masculine-typed jobs, they are disliked for performing competently, 
and this dislike can interfere with their future success.111
 The phenomenon of leadership preferences for men, even by other women, 
reflects a more complex form of bias than discrimination law typically addresses. 
The bias involved here is not as simple as individuals favoring members of their 
own social group or acting with animus against another group.112 The remainder of 
this Article examines the ways in which this iteration of gender bias upsets several 
presumptions of discrimination law with the potential to spur productive thinking 
about law and its relationship to social inequality.
ii. femaLe athLete-to-CoaCh bias as a Counter-paraDiGm
 
 Although widely known by those who dwell in the world of women’s 
athletics, the preference for male coaches is rarely part of the conversation about 
women’s unequal opportunities in coaching. Part of the reason for the silence is that 
it presents a form of gender bias that does not neatly map onto the legal framework 
for gender discrimination. It is counter on several dimensions to the paradigm of 
gender discrimination that the law recognizes.
A. Within-Group, Bottom-Up Bias
 The dominant frame for thinking about discrimination presumes that bias 
emanates top-down and from in-group to out-group. The glass ceiling metaphor 
captures both of these dimensions. The image conjured is usually of a barrier to 
women’s advancement set by men at the top. The case of athlete-coach bias disrupts 
this paradigm on both scores—it is within-group and flows from the bottom-up.
 Discrimination law is designed around the dominant frame. Changing either 
of these presumptions presents complications. For example, despite research 
     109.  Eagly, supra note 100, at 463.
     110.  See Elsesser & Lever, supra note 107, at 1573–75.
     111.  See Heilman et al., supra note 108 (discussing their findings supporting these 
conclusions).
     112.  Cf. Eagly, supra note 100, at 463 (“[S]ocial identity theorists assume that members of 
groups seek to represent their own prototypical characteristics in their leaders. However, group 
members seek leaders who are prototypical, not necessarily of themselves, but of their shared 
ideas about the attributes of good leaders.”).
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demonstrating that members of subordinated groups hold stereotypical and biased 
views of their own social group, discrimination law presumes that discrimination 
is an inter-group phenomenon.113 This presumption is so strong that Justice Scalia 
used it to argue against a doctrine that could lead to an inference of discrimination in 
cases alleging intra-group bias. Writing for the majority in St. Mary’s Honor Center 
v. Hicks, Justice Scalia rejected a rule requiring an inference of discrimination 
from the plaintiff’s proof of pretext .114 He cited the absurdity of finding race 
discrimination based on the falsity of the employer’s explanation in a case where 
there was a disproportionately high number of minorities in the workplace and the 
decision maker was of the same minority race as the plaintiff.115 The unmistakable 
implication of his argument is that bias is not likely to occur between members of 
the same protected class. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has been careful not 
to turn this presumption into a general rule barring liability,116 lower courts have 
openly expressed reluctance to infer discrimination between members of the same 
protected class.117 Representative of the typical thinking discounting within-group 
discrimination, one law review article by a federal magistrate judge on the topic of 
jury instructions in employment discrimination cases matter-of-factly noted that 
“[a] defendant may argue that an inference of no discrimination should be drawn 
from the fact that the decisionmaker [sic] is the same race or sex as the plaintiff.”118
 Although there is not an absolute bar to recovery in such cases, allegations 
of intra-group bias will likely be met with skepticism, both from jurors and from 
judges. In an insightful law review article discussing the social psychology literature 
on people’s resistance to making attributions of discrimination, Katie Eyer explains 
that the unequal treatment of a minority group member by another member of that 
same group is especially unlikely to be attributed to discrimination.119 When 
     113.  See Madden, supra note 100, at 59 (discussing “internalized oppression” and within-
group bias). For an extreme example of intra-group oppression, see Charlene Smith, Nan 
Palmer & Ramon Guillen, Jr., Women Enslaving Women, 21 s. CaL. rev. L. & soC. Just. 319 
(2012). See also Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 miCh. L. 
rev. 2479, 2522–23 (1994) (criticizing reluctance in Title VII law to recognize discrimination 
involving members of the same social group, and discussing the courts’ difficulty with same-
sex harassment cases as an example of this resistance).
     114.  509 U.S. 502 (1993).
     115.  Id. at 513–14.
     116.  See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977) (“[I]t would be unwise to presume 
as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will not discriminate against other 
members of their group.”).
     117.  See, e.g., Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1471 (11th Cir. 1991); Taylor 
v. Proctor & Gamble Dover Wipes, 184 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413 (D. Del. 2002).
     118.  Gerrilyn G. Brill, Instructing the Jury in an Employment Discrimination Case, 1998 
feD. Cts. L. rev. § 4.27 (1998). 
     119.  Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-
Discrimination Law, 96 minn. L. rev. 1275, 1314–15 (2012).
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confronted with such counter-paradigmatic examples of “discrimination,” beliefs 
in the existence of a meritocratic society are likely to override any perception of 
bias.120
 Bottom-up bias is also counter-paradigmatic to discrimination law. For 
example, in Title VII cases, courts equate causation on the basis of a protected class 
status with the possession of a discriminatory motive by some higher-up decision 
maker. The central question in a typical disparate treatment case is whether the 
decision maker (necessarily a superior to the plaintiff) who took the adverse action 
acted with a discriminatory intent. Courts’ struggles with the so-called “cat’s paw” 
cases epitomize the difficulty of retrofitting the law to capture bias from below.121 
One of the thorniest issues in recent Title VII case law is what standard of liability 
applies when the biased actor is in a subordinate role to the ultimate decision 
maker—not even a subordinate role to the plaintiff, but just subordinate to the 
ultimate decision maker. In order to fit such cases to the liability framework of Title 
VII, courts have required proof that the ultimate decision maker acted under the 
influence of, or as “the cat’s paw” of, the biased underling.122 
Even then, one prerequisite to the theory of liability recently endorsed by 
the U.S. Supreme Court for such cases is that the agent with the discriminatory 
motive was a supervisor, albeit a lower-level supervisor than the ultimate decision 
maker.123 The Court expressed no opinion as to whether this path to liability 
would work if it were merely a coworker of the plaintiff who held the requisite 
discriminatory intent.124 Given the Court’s hesitation about how these rules apply 
to bias from coworkers, it seems unlikely that bias from the plaintiff’s supervisees 
would result in employer liability under this framework—at least not unless the 
bias is consciously tolerated or endorsed by a higher-up agent of the employer.
Under Title VII, actionable discrimination must be traced to an agent of the 
employer.125 As the Court’s harassment cases show, vicarious liability—employer 
     120.  Id. at 1317–18.
     121.  See Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 b.u. L. rev. 1431 
(2012), for an illuminating discussion of the “cat’s paw” conundrum. 
     122.  Id.
     123.  See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1194 (2011) (interpreting the Uniformed 
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act).
     124.  Id. at 1194 n.4 (“We express no view as to whether the employer would be liable if a 
co-worker, rather than a supervisor, committed a discriminatory act that influenced the ultimate 
employment decision.”). The Court’s statement appears to assume no higher-up knowledge or 
ratification of the coworker’s discriminatory act. Such knowledge, and an accompanying failure 
to take corrective action to remediate the discriminatory actions of coworkers, is the prevailing 
theory of employer liability for coworker harassment, which should apply to harassment by 
subordinates as well.
     125.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). The statute makes it unlawful for an employer to 
engage in an unlawful employment action, and defines “employer” to include “any agent” of 
the employer. Id. § 2000e(b).
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liability that is based on the discriminatory acts of an agent of the employer—
requires such an agent to have formal, supervisory authority over the plaintiff.126 
Absent such a relationship with a discriminatory actor, establishing employer 
liability requires a direct theory of wrongdoing by the employer. However, other 
than in the limited realm of harassment cases involving harassment by coworkers 
and other non-supervisors, the courts have not embraced negligence-type theories 
of employer liability.127 And even when plaintiffs do allege negligent responses to 
harassment by the employer, they have a particularly difficult time prevailing when 
the alleged harasser is a subordinate who is supervised by the plaintiff.128 Thus, the 
liability rules of Title VII are strongly tied to agency principles based on formal 
lines of authority, with a discriminatory actor/agent of the employer subjecting a 
subordinate to a discriminatory employment action.
 Formal authority, however, is not the only kind of power within an 
organization, nor the only conduit for discrimination. Literature in organizational 
dynamics distinguishes “authority,” which emanates from the formal channels and 
relationships established by the employer, from “power,” which is more diffuse 
and is not necessarily tied to the formal lines of authority.129 Some employees with 
low authority may be very powerful in the organization due to their influence 
over others, personal characteristics, expertise, value to the organization, or other 
variables.130 Women with formal authority in the workplace may be undermined by 
bias from lower-level supervisees with informal power.131 But discrimination law 
     126.  See, e.g., Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013); Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
     127.  See, e.g., David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 u. pa. L. 
rev. 899 (1993) (arguing for an expansion of discrimination law to encompass negligence as a 
theory of employer wrongdoing); Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 miCh. 
L. rev. 69 (2011) (critiquing the courts’ reliance on frameworks in deciding discrimination 
cases, and arguing that the rigid adherence to these frameworks has excluded consideration of 
negligent discrimination as a theory of employer liability). But cf. Katharine T. Bartlett, Making 
Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace 
Discrimination, 95 va. L. rev. 1893, 1959–60 (2009) (arguing against broader, negligence-
based theories of liability for their potential to deepen, rather than eradicate, people’s implicit 
biases).
     128. See Ann Carey Juliano, Harassing Women with Power: The Case for Including Contra-
Power Harassment Within Title VII, 87 b.u. L. rev. 491, 519–23 (2007) (discussing the ways 
courts have found to rule against harassment plaintiffs in “contra-power” harassment cases 
involving harassment by subordinates).
     129.  See Susan D. Carle, Acknowledging Informal Power Dynamics in the Workplace: A 
Proposal for Further Development of the Vicarious Liability Doctrine in Hostile Environment 
Sexual Harassment Cases, 13 Duke J. GenDer L. & poL’y 85, 104–06 (2006) (discussing this 
literature).
     130.   Id. at 105.
     131.  See, e.g., Juliano, supra note 128, at 497–503, 523–60 (using literature on power 
within organizations to argue for judicial acceptance of “contra-power” harassment cases, 
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rarely captures such inverse-authority cases, since its lens is trained on a higher-up 
authority figure that acts with discriminatory intent against the plaintiff.
 The case of female athlete-coach bias breaks from the paradigm of 
discrimination law on both of these fronts: it involves bias by women against 
women, and it is directed from subordinates to a superior. This bias doubly defies 
the law’s presumptions about how discrimination operates within institutions.
B. Troubling Women’s Agency
 Female athlete-to-coach bias raises another troubling issue for 
discrimination law that is unsettling to the dominant model. This issue concerns 
how to approach women’s agency, which is often framed in terms of choice, in 
relation to discrimination law. Typically, discrimination law takes a liberal account 
of women’s agency—it accepts women’s choices as authentic and takes a skeptical 
approach to constraints on those choices. An example of a paradigmatic case is 
the equal protection challenge to the exclusion of women from the Virginia 
Military Institute (VMI). In supporting the women who wanted to go to VMI, sex 
discrimination law functioned as a tool for challenging discriminatory obstacles 
that interfere with women’s choices.132 Similarly, employment discrimination 
law targets discrimination against women seeking entrance to nontraditional 
jobs without questioning their choices. The opposite is also true—employment 
discrimination law takes an uncritical approach to women’s expressed choices not 
to do masculine-typed work.133 The prevailing approach of discrimination law, as 
wielded to vindicate women’s rights, is to register women’s choices as autonomous 
and worthy of support, with law standing by as a vehicle to vindicate those choices 
if blocked by discriminatory barriers.
 To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that the discriminatory preference 
for male coaches should itself be conceptualized as a form of women’s agency. 
Interfering with another’s chosen path for a discriminatory reason is not the same 
thing as setting the course for one’s own life path. Discrimination law has long 
rejected the discriminatory preferences of clients and customers as justification for 
unlawful discrimination.134 Rather, my objective here is to use the athlete-coach 
preference as an example that highlights the need to examine how institutional bias 
where the plaintiff is harassed by lower-level workers, while acknowledging that courts lack 
experience with such cases).
     132.  See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
     133.  See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988); Vicki Schultz, 
Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the 
Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 harv. L. rev. 1749 
(1990) (critiquing that case and others like it).
    134.  See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276–77 (9th Cir. 1981); Diaz v. 
Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971).
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and gender dynamics shape and constrain choice.
 The case of the female athlete-to-coach bias forces us to grapple with the 
complexity of women’s agency by looking at it from an unusual angle. To call on 
discrimination law to intervene here—and to speak of female athlete-to-coach bias 
as a form of illegitimate, discriminatory bias—exposes female athletes’ preferences 
as biased, inauthentic, and likely a product of a gendered institution. It brings to the 
surface a question regarding the dilemma of law’s relationship to women’s agency: 
when should law effectuate women’s choices and when should it debunk them 
as false consciousness or internalized oppression? As with most starkly framed 
questions, it depends. Feminist legal theory must continue to do the work of fleshing 
out the relevant contingencies and the theories for sorting through them.135
 For feminist legal strategists, choice is a double-edged sword. Both the 
advocates and detractors of sex equality claims find themselves on alternative sides 
of the blade. Liberal feminist strategies mostly use the law to validate and support 
women’s choices. When sex discrimination law is invoked to effectuate women’s 
expressed choices, it is usually the advocates on the other side who question 
women’s choices: do they or should they really want to serve in combat, go to VMI, 
play a contact sport, have an abortion, or get the break-neck job at the top of the 
corporate ladder? For example, law professor Jill Hasday has detailed a rich history 
of the use of “mutual benefits” arguments by opponents of equality initiatives to 
question whether women and people of color really know what is good for them.136 
Such arguments posit that the true best interests of the members of these groups 
are not in line with the position of feminist or minority interest groups. The “regret 
thesis” in opposition to abortion rights (the argument that women will later regret 
having an abortion with ensuing psychological harm) and the “stigma” objection to 
affirmative action are recent examples of these kinds of arguments.137
 However, the appeal to women’s preferences can work in the other direction 
as well. At times, “listening to what women want” is a strategy deployed to derail 
sex equality projects. Women’s choice to scale back career plans and opt for greater 
life-work balance is cited in opposition to efforts to identify and challenge the 
gender pay gap, the glass ceiling, and the maternal wall.138 Women’s participation 
in the pro-life movement, for instance, is used to undercut sex equality arguments 
     135.  See Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 harv. L. rev. 1657 (1997), for 
a theoretically rich article exploring the tensions in feminist legal theory and in constitutional 
theory surrounding women’s agency.
     136.  Jill Elaine Hasday, Protecting Them from Themselves: The Persistence of Mutual 
Benefits Arguments for Sex and Race Inequality, 84 n.y.u. L. rev. 1464 (2009).
     137.  Id. at 1478, 1491.
     138.  See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet 
Title VII: Some Contemporary Influences, 92 miCh. L. rev. 2370, 2374–75 (1994) (discussing 
how the contemporary media emphasizes “women’s choice to subordinate their careers to 
accommodate family obligations” to explain women’s occupational status in the workplace).
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challenging restrictions on abortion as a form of sex discrimination.139 For example, 
not all women oppose abortion, so restrictions on abortion must not amount to 
sex discrimination against women. In litigation under Title IX brought by student 
athletes, plaintiffs seeking additional sports for women have had to battle survey 
evidence purporting to show that women’s lower participation rates in athletics 
reflects women’s choices and lower level of interest than men in playing sports 
rather than discriminatory opportunities.140 Closer to the focal point of this Article, 
arguments that women’s underrepresentation in coaching reflects sex discrimination 
are countered by arguments that the low numbers reflect women’s choices not to 
enter such a demanding occupation. Justice Scalia made a similar argument, in 
a male plaintiff’s reverse discrimination challenge to a county affirmative action 
plan, in explaining women’s absences in road construction jobs were a product of 
their own preferences rather than sex discrimination.141 In these and other examples, 
women’s choice is offered as a rebuttal to sex equality claims. The response from 
sex equality advocates is usually to pierce women’s asserted preferences or choices 
as a product of societal and cultural forces, including discrimination.
 What is often missing in these battles is a richer, more nuanced discussion 
of how sex equality law, feminist theory, and advocacy should grapple with the 
problem of women’s agency. When are women’s choices authentic and deserving 
of validation and when are they the product of the very system of gender relations 
being contested? Alas, this Article does not hold the answers to these deep questions, 
but I find the example of female athlete-coach bias helpful in thinking about them. 
For one thing, this particular bias sits at the underside of sex equality’s relationship 
to choice, using feminist legal methods to interrogate and expose women’s choices 
as a product of patriarchal institutions. Examining female athletes’ preference for 
male coaches reveals how the institution of sport and the organization of athletic 
departments construct gendered understandings of what it means to be a coach 
and the nature of the athlete-coach relationship. This inquiry leads to a broader 
examination of the barriers to women in coaching, including the disincentives for 
women to choose to go into the coaching profession and the gendered position of 
female athletes in sport. With fewer women in the coaching pipeline, fewer women 
getting jobs despite being in the pipeline, and evidence showing women coaches 
are equally, if not more, qualified than their male competitors for coaching jobs, the 
     139.  See Brief of Feminists for Life of America, Professional Women’s Network, et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 
(1993) (No. 90-985).
     140.  See brake, supra note 1, at 77-80 (discussing this argument and the courts’ response 
to it); see also id. at 218-22 (discussing the controversy over the now rescinded 2005 Office for 
Civil Rights Clarification allowing educational institutions to comply with Title IX’s test for 
unequal participation opportunities by disproving the existence of female interest in additional 
sports through the use of student interest surveys).
     141.  See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 658–61 (1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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preference takes shape as a stark example of the power of institutions to produce 
preferences that are the product of institutional bias and discrimination.
 In her classic work exploring women’s agency in relation to feminist legal 
theory, Kathryn Abrams elaborated a conception of partial agency to use in thinking 
about women’s choices.142 Partial agency captures both the power of women to 
strategically think and act for themselves, and the constraints women’s situations 
impose on them in the process. The concept of partial agency remains helpful in 
thinking about the vitality and limits of choice. Yet, partial agency cannot, and 
never purported to, determine when gender justice projects should work to fulfill 
women’s choices, and when they should interrogate or subvert them.
 While there is no satisfactory globalizing answer to this problem, female 
athlete-to-coach bias makes me envision a conception of embedded agency, in 
which women’s choices and preferences are embedded within and shaped by the 
institutions in which they work, live, and play. An institutional model of choice is a 
counterpoint to the liberal view of choice. However, it is also a more institutionally 
focused model than a social constructionist one that looks at broader cultural 
influences.143 The starting point for thinking about choice is that, like the institutions 
in which it is embedded, choice is complex, unstable, and changeable over time. 
Choices and preferences are not stand alone, abstract, or a-contextual; they are 
made in the context of and shaped by the institutions in which people are situated.
 The case study of the female athlete preference offers a reminder of just 
how powerful institutions are in shaping the preferences of persons within them. 
In this case, the preference for male coaches was not always there; it emerged after 
women were integrated into the male-dominant model of sport, under a shared 
governance structure. The preference is also situational—having experience with 
female coaches negatively affects the preference for a male coach. 
Upon studying the literature on women in sport and women in coaching, 
it becomes clear that institutional norms, including the win-at-all-cost model of 
coaching that has become dominant in intercollegiate sport, play an important role 
in constructing preferences for male coaches. Literature on women in leadership 
finds that traditionally masculine styles of leadership within organizations promote 
stereotypical thinking about the gender of leaders.144 Conversely, novel approaches 
to leadership, such as placing an emphasis on the need for transformational leaders 
to promote organizational change in a time of crisis, can reverse the preference 
     
     142.  See Kathryn Abrams, Complex Claimants and Reductive Moral Judgments: New 
Patterns in the Search for Equality, 57 u. pitt. L. rev. 337 (1996); Kathryn Abrams, Sex 
Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 CoLum. L. rev. 304 (1995); 
see also martha ChamaLLas, introDuCtion to feminist LeGaL theory 116–21 (3d ed. 2013) 
(summarizing this and other legal scholarship by “partial agency feminists”).
     143.  See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 135, at 1697 (elaborating a social constructionist approach 
to agency that focuses on diffuse, cultural constraints on women’s views and preferences).
     144.  See, e.g., Madden, supra note 100, at 57–58.
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and, under the right conditions, actually favor women for leadership positions.145 
In addition, the extent to which an institution is highly masculinized also affects 
gender preferences for leaders. In institutions in which men greatly outnumber 
women, required tasks are associated with masculinity and the organization is 
structured hierarchically, creating idealized conceptions of leadership that are 
highly masculinized.146 Not surprisingly, bias against female leaders is more likely 
in jobs that are gender typed as masculine.147
 In sport, these institutional gender dynamics create a perfect storm for 
women interlopers—the combination of mostly male leadership, masculine styles 
of leadership (autocratic and directive coaching styles), and the strong masculine 
coding of sport itself all create a field that is primed for producing gender bias 
against women coaches.148 An institutional approach to choice highlights the ways 
in which these institutional structures and cultures shape and construct women’s 
preferences for male coaches.
 Gender justice projects would benefit from richer theories of embedded 
agency. We need tools for distinguishing resistance from co-optation. The 
institutional forces that construct discriminatory preferences toward others can also 
distort the choices women make for themselves. Of course, to speak of co-optation 
carries with it the risk of paternalism and pathologizing women’s voices—“You 
don’t really want a man instead of a woman as coach,” or “You really should want 
to become a coach.”149 However, taking choice at face value poses even greater 
risks for gender justice projects. Illuminating the institutional forces that shape both 
men’s and women’s choice has a better chance of taking the sting out of the ring 
of paternalism than a more general social-constructionist approach that focuses on 
broader societal and cultural messages. Interdisciplinary work in social psychology 
and sociology can help feminist scholars and advocates reveal the underpinnings of 
choice and the processes by which institutions shape them.
 In the midst of dissonant clashes over the meanings of women’s choice in 
the gender culture wars, the female athlete-to-coach preference stands as a stark 
example of the power of institutions to shape preferences—all the more so because 
literature on women coaches shows that they are just as, if not more, qualified to be 
coaches compared to their male competitors. While discrimination law is fashioned 
     145.  See Elizabeth R. Brown, Amanda B. Diekman & Monica C. Schneider, A Change 
Will Do Us Good: Threats Diminish Typical Preferences for Male Leaders, 37 personaLity & 
soC. psyChoL. buLL. 930 (2011); Gary N. Powell, D. Anthony Butterfield & Kathryn M. Bartol, 
Leader Evaluations: A New Female Advantage?, 23 GenDer in mGmt: an int’L J. 156 (2008).
     146.  See Madden, supra note 100, at 66.
     147.  See Eagly, supra note 67, at 6; Garcia-Retamero & López-Zafra, supra note 107, at 
51–53, 59.
     148.  Cf. Eagly, supra note 100, at 465–66.
     149.  See Higgins, supra note 135, at 1697 (acknowledging the risks of “pathologizing” 
women’s internalized views by elaborating the social and cultural forces that constrain them).
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to effectuate women’s choices when thwarted by discriminatory barriers, this case 
study is a reminder that we still need feminist tools and legal strategies to critically 
examine women’s choices and what underlies them, not just to ratify them.
C. Multi-Dimensional and Multi-Lateral Bias
 A third way in which the athlete-to-coach example runs counter to the law’s 
paradigm of discrimination is in the interconnections it reveals in the workings 
of bias. Discrimination law presumes that bias takes a form that is both one-
dimensional (singling out one protected class for adverse treatment) and unilateral 
(a one-way vector from perpetrator to victim). Again, female athlete-to-coach bias 
defies the prototype of discrimination reflected in law.
 As discussed above, the gender bias against female coaches is inextricably 
intertwined with anti-lesbian bias in women’s sports. As more than two decades’ 
exposure to legal scholarship led by critical race feminists in the 1990s has 
demonstrated, this example is in good company with many others involving 
multiple and intersecting dimensions of bias.150 At this point, there is an extensive 
body of legal scholarship demonstrating that one-dimensional models obscure and 
distort how the intersection of identities matters in understanding and remedying 
discrimination.151 Yet, discrimination law continues to proceed from a premise of 
discrete protected classes as the target of discrimination, and it stumbles badly 
when it comes to addressing bias at the intersection of gender and sexuality.152
 The intersection of anti-gay and gender bias here is far from novel. Yet, it 
is a particularly stark example of the inseparability of gender and anti-gay bias. 
As elaborated in greater detail above, the gender bias against women coaches is 
part and parcel of a homophobic anxiety about strong women in sports. Traditional 
gender norms of femininity create role incongruity for women who excel in sports 
as athletes and as leaders. In response, sport and gender scholars have identified a 
“female apologetic” performed by some women in sport to “cover” for their defiance 
of traditional gender norms by providing reassurance of a heterosexual femininity.153 
The apologetic takes numerous forms, including overcompensating with feminine 
makeup, hairstyles, and clothes, and even highlighting these performances over 
athleticism in media portrayals of women in sport. The apologetic responds to the 
     
     150.  See ChamaLLas, supra note 142, at 91–111, for a summary of this history and the key 
intersectional scholarship in this era.
     151.  Id.
     152.  See, e.g., Zachary A. Kramer, Some Preliminary Thoughts on Title VII’s Intersexions, 
7 Geo. J. GenDer & L. 31 (2006) (critiquing Title VII’s approach to cases involving both gender 
and sexual orientation bias); Zachary A. Kramer, Three Tales of Female Masculinity, 13 nev. 
L.J. 458 (2013) (discussing the failure of discrimination law to adequately address bias against 
women that involves both sexism and homophobia).
     153.  See supra text accompanying note 63.
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“paradox” that to be good at sport, in a culture infused with gender polarity, is 
masculinizing.154 To avoid aspersions of masculinity linked to lesbianism requires 
compensating with cultural cues that provide proof of femininity. Female athletes’ 
preference for a male coach is embedded in this context. Having a woman coach, 
especially a woman whose sexuality is suspect, leaves the team vulnerable to an 
“image” problem. The image problem in women’s sports is code for the taint of 
lesbianism. Having a male coach “softens” the image and brings a “wholesome” 
appeal. It takes the edge off to have elite women athletes who answer to a male 
coach. In this light, the preference for a man can be viewed as a form of the 
apologetic, a deflection of anti-lesbian bias that may attach to a woman coach and, 
by extension, to her team.
 While there is no new terrain here, the importance of this project has not 
lessened in the intervening decades since intersectional scholarship took off. 
Exploring these intersections remains necessary to correct the rigid and stultifying 
boundaries of protected classes in discrimination law. The female athlete-to-coach 
bias is also multi-dimensional in a way that is not often recognized in legal literature 
on discrimination—it is mutually reinforcing and non-linear. That is, rather than 
a single vector of bias running from athletes to coaches, the bias that runs from 
female athletes to coaches both reflects and reinforces gender bias against female 
athletes themselves.
 Discrimination law conceives of bias as a discrete arrow with a singular class 
of targets. In the eyes of the law, any discrimination against coaches is considered 
to be separate and distinct from any discrimination against athletes. Tristin Green’s 
phrase “insular individualism” captures this paradigm, with the assumption of a 
biased decision maker acting discretely and unilaterally with precision-stroke aim 
against a target.155 This presumption infuses discrimination law.
 One example is in Title IX’s treatment of pay discrimination against coaches 
in women’s sports. When coaches of women’s teams receive lower pay than 
the coaches of men’s teams, as they often do, any possible discrimination claim 
“belongs” to the coach, not the female athletes. In order for the athletes to challenge 
the lower salaries paid to their coaches as discriminatory, they would have to show 
that the lower pay produces tangibly worse coaching. This requirement generally 
blocks athletes from challenging the discriminatory pay given to women’s athletic 
coaches, even though the coaches’ pay disparities between men’s and women’s 
sports reflect and reinforce the lower valuation that schools place on women’s 
sports and their second-class status.156
     154.  See Sally R. Ross & Kimberly J. Shinew, Perspectives of Women College Athletes on 
Sport and Gender, 58 seX roLes 40 (2008).
     155.  See Tristin K. Green, Insular Individualism: Employment Discrimination Law After 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear, 43 harv. C.r.-C.L. L. rev. 353 (2008).
     156.  See brake, supra note 1, at 205–06 (explaining and critiquing the limits of Title IX in 
addressing discrimination in coaches’ pay for women’s teams).
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 A second example comes from retaliation law under Title VII. There 
is a growing body of case law holding that it is unreasonable for employees to 
believe that discrimination against a group of non-employees, such as students, 
clients, customers, or other persons served by the organization, could ever amount 
to discrimination against employees.157 As a result, employee complaints about 
such discriminatory activities are unprotected from retaliation under Title VII. In 
these cases, decided under the reasonable belief doctrine in Title VII retaliation 
law, employees allege that they suffered retaliation after complaining about 
discrimination in the institution’s treatment of others. Courts have dismissed 
such retaliation claims on the ground that discrimination against non-employees 
is entirely irrelevant to any discrimination that employees might encounter. For 
example, teachers and other school employees who complain about discrimination 
against students are ruled “unreasonable” for believing that discrimination against 
students could create a discriminatory work environment for employees at the 
school.158 These cases tightly adhere to the paradigm of discrimination as a unilateral 
process that runs discretely from one actor to a target class.159
 Contrary to the law’s presumption of unilateral bias, the example of athlete-
to-coach bias shows that bias in the real world is not so neat and one-dimensional. 
There are multiple, intersecting arrows of bias at work here. In the world of 
women’s sports, where the women’s game is devalued in comparison to the men’s 
game and athletic excellence is equated with masculinity, female athletes face 
tremendous pressures. One way of responding to these pressures, and to achieve 
greater legitimacy as athletes, is to have a male coach.
 However, the preference for a male coach does not just reflect discrimination 
     157.  See, e.g., Bonn v. City of Omaha, 623 F.3d 587 (8th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff-employee 
lacked a reasonable belief that a police department’s alleged racial bias against civilians in 
the community could discriminate against employees of the police department); Wimmer v. 
Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep’t, 176 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 1999) (same); Crowley v. Prince George’s 
Cnty., 890 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1989) (same); Neely v. City of Broken Arrow, No. 07-CV-0018, 
2007 WL 4209073 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 26, 2007) (plaintiff-employee lacked a reasonable belief 
that firefighters’ sexual harassment of members of the public violated Title VII).
     158.  See, e.g., Bakhtiari v. Lutz, 507 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 2007) (employee’s complaint 
about perceived discrimination against students was not protected activity under Title VII); 
Artis v. Francis Howell N. Band Booster Ass’n, 161 F.3d 1178 (8th Cir. 1998) (same); Evans 
v. Kansas City Mo. Sch. Dist., 65 F.3d 98 (8th Cir. 1995) (same); Lamb-Bowman v. Del. State 
Univ., 152 F. Supp. 2d 553 (D. Del. 2001) (complaint by women’s basketball coach about 
unequal treatment of women’s team was not protected activity under Title VII since it did not 
involve discrimination against employees); Hill v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., No. 02 C 3534, 2004 
WL 626147 (N.D. Ill. March 29, 2004) (employee’s complaint about perceived discrimination 
against students was not protected activity under Title VII).
     159.  See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89 inD. L.J. (forthcoming 
2014) for a critique of these cases for failing to recognize the interrelation of bias as it affects 
employees and the persons served by their organizations.
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against female athletes; it also reinscribes it. Discrimination against women coaches 
and the underrepresentation of women in sport leadership positions reinforces 
a presumption of male athletic superiority that contributes to the devaluation of 
women’s sports.160 The lack of women in sport leadership positions contributes to 
the secondary status of female athletes and has a negative effect on the athletes’ 
own self-perceptions.161 It also suppresses female athletes’ career aspirations in 
sport—women who are coached by men are less likely to enter sport careers than 
are women who are coached by women.162 The preference for a male coach thus 
contributes to the hostile climate for women in sports, for athletes as well as coaches.
 The preference for male coaches complicates Title IX’s success story for 
female athletes, not just by highlighting the plight of a discrete group of women 
coaches left behind, but by uncovering deep, structural bias remaining against 
female athletes themselves. The preference reflects the persistence of institutional 
bias against women in sport and the higher valuation of men in sport, where athletic 
excellence is equated with maleness. The same masculine values that construct 
women as less valuable coaches also construct women as less valuable athletes. 
While at one level, female athletes’ desire for a male coach is a strategy to deflect bias 
by claiming a greater legitimacy for a women’s team in an androcentric institution, 
at a deeper level it simultaneously reinforces the devaluation of women in sport by 
contributing to the precarious situation for women in coaching.163 The preceding 
discussion highlighted three ways in which the athlete-to-coach bias example runs 
counter to the paradigm of discrimination at the heart of discrimination law: it defies 
the prototype of discrimination as an in-group-to-out-group, top-down phenomenon; 
     160.  Cf. Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation 
and Biased Prototypes, 74 s. CaL. L. rev. 747, 755–78 (2001) (articulating a theory of 
devaluation as a form of bias that discrimination law should address).
     161.  See LaVoi & Dutove, supra note 25, at 18 (“A dearth of female role models in visible 
positions can lead to many unfavourable outcomes for girls and women, including devaluation 
of abilities and self-perceptions, failure to realize sport career aspirations and potential, and an 
inability to challenge or resist negative stereotypes regarding gender and leadership.”) (citations 
omitted).
     162.  Id. (citing research that found “female athletes who were coached by males are less 
likely to pursue a career in coaching than females coached by females”) (citation omitted); 
see also Moran-Miller & Flores, supra note 20, at 110 (citing existing research showing a 
link between women’s interest in coaching and experience of having women coaches); id. at 
115 (interpreting authors’ research findings to support the conclusion that “a single positive 
female coaching role model may positively influence female athletes’ perceptions about career 
possibilities”).
     163.  See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Volunteer Discrimination, 40 u.C. Davis L. rev. 1895 
(2007), for an illuminating discussion of an example of interlocking and mutually-reinforcing 
within-group bias; namely, support from some African Americans of the National Basketball 
Association’s racist dress code policy as a form of “volunteer discrimination,” in which minority 
group members “perform” their racial identity in an effort to deflect bias, but end up deepening 
the structures of bias.
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it complicates the liberal view of women’s agency reflected in the law; and it reveals 
the multi-dimensional, non-linear workings of bias within institutions.164 Each of 
these departures from the paradigm is important for understanding the complexity 
of bias and the limits of the existing law’s approach. The final Part offers some 
concluding thoughts on why studying counter-paradigms such as this one is useful 
for generating insights about law and its relationship to social inequality.
iii. some thouGhts on the usefuLness of Counter-paraDiGms to GenDer 
JustiCe proJeCts
 What is to be gained by bringing to the forefront a counter-paradigm like 
the athlete-coach bias scrutinized here? I envision two possible benefits, both of 
which are related. First, calling attention to the gaps between discrimination law 
and real-world bias can bring a fresh perspective on the need to go beyond the 
limits of legal claims in pursuing social equality. Second, and relatedly, exposing 
essentialist notions about discrimination reflected in the law, both in terms of what 
counts as “discrimination” and how protected classes experience it, may help in 
identifying and effectively opposing discrimination both through legal and extra-
legal channels.
 First, counter-paradigms such as this one can provide a corrective to the 
over-simplified model of discrimination reflected in the law. Single-minded efforts 
to pierce the glass ceiling by pursuing conscious discrimination from the men at the 
top, for example, will miss the institutional features that block women’s success 
from the ground up. Fresh perspectives for seeing the complexity of discrimination 
can help critique the presumption of insular individualism that is so prevalent in 
law.
 Shedding light on the limits of discrimination law and its disconnect with 
real-world bias is important not just to argue for expanding the set of practices that 
are actionable under the law (although that may be desirable), but perhaps more 
importantly to push back against limited popular understandings of what counts 
as “discrimination.” Too often, these understandings are cut short by the narrow 
limits of the law. People’s beliefs about what is fair and just are shaped by their 
understanding of what is sanctioned by law and the expressive value of law.165 One 
     164. See Chamallas, supra note 160, at 778–804, for an extensive and illuminating 
discussion of biased prototypes. Most analogous to this discussion is Professor Chamallas’s 
discussion of how the prototypical understanding of what counts as a hate crime pushes aside 
broader understandings of and legal remedies for hate-motivated criminal conduct. Id. at 795–
801.
    165.  See Deborah L. Brake, Perceiving Subtle Sexism: Mapping the Social-Psychological 
Forces and Legal Narratives That Obscure Gender Bias, 16 CoLum. J. GenDer & L. 679 
(2007) (discussing the social psychology of perceiving discrimination, and exploring how the 
narrow confines of discrimination law obscure people’s understandings and perceptions of 
discrimination).
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of the findings from social psychology literature on women in leadership is that 
perceiving one’s judgment to be objective and nondiscriminatory actually makes 
gender bias more likely.166 That is, operating under an illusion of objectivity and 
neutrality is actually worse than having an awareness of being biased.167 Practices of 
bias that are outside the reach of discrimination law thus run the risk of contributing 
to perceptions of a just world, precisely because they fall outside the boundaries of 
the law’s prohibitions. To the extent that discrimination law’s blinders contribute 
to the illusion of neutrality, it is important to expose the existence of complex, 
institutional bias that eludes the law’s grasp.
 Just as people should understand that discrimination law leaves much bias 
and discrimination unregulated, gender justice projects need to go beyond the limits 
of discrimination law in setting an agenda for social change. Even if more complex 
forms of bias are not remediable through legal claims, advocates for gender equality 
should pursue broader strategies for addressing institutional bias against women in 
leadership.168 For example, some research suggests bias favoring male leaders can 
be minimized by highlighting individualized information for particular women, 
which then makes gender less salient for priming stereotypes.169 More structural 
changes would focus on changing masculine structures and norms in institutions.170 
In sport, such structural changes might include replacing the win-at-all cost model 
of athletics with a more educational approach that emphasizes participation and the 
educational value of sport—a tall order, to be sure. Rethinking what it means to be 
a coach—replacing yelling and punishment for not winning with an emphasis on 
skills building, mentoring, and team building for well-rounded student athletes—
could also weaken the connections between coaching and masculinity, thereby 
destabilizing the preference for male coaches.
 The second thing counter-paradigms can do is expose essentialist notions 
in law about the meaning of discrimination and how protected classes are situated 
in relation to discrimination. By presenting an alternative to the prototype of 
discrimination, counter-paradigms open up opportunities for expanding the concept 
of discrimination to encompass its more complex iterations. The example here 
demonstrates the fallacy of seeing sex discrimination as simply a zero-sum game 
of men versus women. It exposes essentialist notions about women, the protected 
class, and where they stand in relation to sex discrimination. As legal scholarship 
     166.  See Uhlmann & Cohen, supra note 51, at 477.
     167.  Id.
     168.  See Bartlett, supra note 127, at 1960–61, for an example of legal scholarship advocating 
institutional de-biasing strategies without expanding the boundaries of discrimination law to 
require them.
     169.  Madden, supra note 100, at 57.
     170.  See, e.g., id. at 70 (discussing models of organizational change that would promote 
women’s access to leadership).
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on identity has shown, there are multiple ways of performing identity.171 One that 
gets less attention is the performance of women acting in ways that re-inscribe 
gender bias against other women.
 Critiques of essentialism in the treatment of women typically focus 
on women’s differences in experiencing oppression, including exposing how 
relatively privileged women (white, straight, middle-class, able-bodied) are too 
often the implicit launching point for elaborating the harms of discrimination.172 
A less-explored side of essentialism is the undifferentiated view of women as 
victims of gender oppression and not as oppressors. The essentialist problem in 
sex discrimination law is not just that it obscures the complexity of how women 
experience oppression. A different kind of essentialist problem is the assumption 
that if there is sex discrimination then all women would be on the victim side of it.
 Discrimination law takes women’s accommodation to sexist norms as 
evidence discounting or undermining the existence of discrimination. For example, 
proof that other women in the workplace did not find particular behaviors offensive 
or harassing may undermine a female plaintiff’s sexual harassment case.173 Further, 
proof that other women have succeeded in the workplace may undermine a plaintiff’s 
claim of sex discrimination in hiring and promotions.174 In the same vein, using 
women on trial teams that defend employers in sex discrimination cases is a tried 
and true tactic of the defense bar, in order to give the court and jury “permission” 
to deny the existence of sex discrimination, since women are seen defending the 
employer.175 Angela Onwuachi-Willig makes a related point in highlighting courts’ 
     171.  See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. Contemp. 
LeGaL issues 701, 701–02 (2001).
     172.  See Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender Law, 1 Duke J. GenDer L. & poL’y 1 (1994) 
(discussing various strands of essentialism, including “false universalism” in taking the plight 
of privileged women to stand for all, and “gender imperialism” in assuming gender as the 
primary axis for understanding women’s oppression).
     173.  See Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and 
the Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 emory L.J. 151, 205 (1994) (criticizing courts’ use of a 
reasonableness standard, in deciding whether sexual harassment is severe or pervasive, and for 
opening the door to arguments that “[t]he other women in the office were not bothered by the 
harassment; therefore, the plaintiff is hypersensitive”).
     174.  See miChaeL J. zimmer, CharLes a. suLLivan & rebeCCa hanner White, Cases anD 
materiaLs on empLoyment DisCrimination 101–02 (8th ed. 2013), for a concise discussion 
of how courts consider evidence that other members of the plaintiff’s group have succeeded 
in the workplace. Cf. Abrams, supra note 113, at 2521–22 (explaining that the dominant 
view of discrimination in Title VII law requires that “the employer’s judgment—which may 
posit employment-related incapacity or generalized inferiority (disparate treatment, sexual 
harassment) or reflect insensitivity to the group’s social circumstances (disparate impact)—
must be applicable to the group as a whole”).
     175.  See, e.g., pauL m. barrett, the GooD bLaCk: a true story of raCe in ameriCa 166–
69 (1999) (relaying the story of an African American female lawyer who generally did criminal 
defense work, but was assigned to defend a firm against an employment discrimination charge).
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use of testimony by black witnesses against black plaintiffs as evidence to discredit 
plaintiffs’ race discrimination claims.176
 Outside the courtroom, cooperation by some women with practices 
challenged by other women as sexist is also used to defeat the credibility of the 
challengers and validate the challenged practices. When this occurs, the presumption 
of homogeneity among women in relation to sexism obscures the complexity of 
bias, making it harder to mobilize resistance. Ignoring the phenomenon of within-
group bias operates to protect and preserve gender privilege.
 Turning the lens on counter-paradigmatic examples like female athlete-
coach bias disrupts the presumptions that enable women’s accommodation to 
sexist norms to defeat claims of gender bias. The female athlete bias is a stark 
reminder that just because some women accede to sexism (or even practice it) does 
not mean that sexism does not exist. In the athlete-coach example, women athletes 
are strategically deploying sexism when responding to gender subordination in 
sport. It is an example of members of a subordinated group strategically aligning 
their interests with the dominant group as a tactic to avoid or mitigate the sting of 
subordination.
 In this respect, the female athlete-coach bias is an example of a particular 
kind of “female masculinity”—women performing a hegemonic masculinity in 
order to position themselves strategically and advantageously within a system of 
gender oppression.177 That some women can take advantage of masculine norms 
does not erase the gender privilege that men receive from the hierarchical valuation 
of masculinity over femininity. Nor does it subvert the linkages between men and 
masculinity, traditionally defined. Rather, women’s practices of masculinity can be 
deployed to stabilize and support gender oppression. In this case, it is a practice 
that legitimizes the gender binary in sports. When women act the part of “female 
chauvinist pig,” men’s practices of sexism gain a veneer of gender neutrality. The 
male athletic director who avoids hiring a woman coach looks less sexist if the 
female athletes do not want a woman coach either. Sport thus becomes further 
linked to masculinity, with athletic competence and superiority defined as male, 
while evading challenge as a masculinist institution. Exposing the practices of 
female masculinity is thus crucial to the work of recognizing and questioning the 
deep structures of masculinity that subordinate women—especially those of women 
who cannot, or choose not to, strategically side with masculine norms.
 Whether or not counter-paradigms spark critiques that actually succeed in 
broadening the reach of discrimination law, they are useful in challenging limited 
popular understandings of what counts as discrimination and essentialist notions 
     176.  Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 163, at 1927.
     177.  Cf. Juliet Williams, Comments at Author Meets Reader: Masculinities and the Law 
at the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting: Power, Privilege, and the Pursuit of 
Justice: Legal Challenges in Precarious Times (May 31, 2013) (on file with author) (calling for 
masculinities theorists and feminist scholars to discuss and analyze female masculinity).
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of women in relationship to discrimination. If powerful enough, they may help 
mobilize and broaden the scope of social justice projects. The problem of female 
athlete-to-coach bias is an issue that has remained off the radar screen of Title IX and 
gender equity advocates for women in sport. A downside of working in law is that it 
can too often occupy the field in framing gender equality issues. Exploring counter-
paradigms can help correct that limited vision. Here, the example of within-group, 
upstream bias of female athletes toward female coaches offers a fresh vantage point 
for rethinking the boundaries of discrimination law and its relationship to gender 
equality.
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